

## Discussion

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### Against the Sociology of Art

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#### AESTHETIC VERSUS SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ART ACTIVITIES

Aesthetic theories of art refuse to go away. In spite of decades of criticism and derision, a minority of thinkers stubbornly persist in maintaining that we need a general theory of art that makes essential appeal to beauty, elegance, daintiness, and other aesthetic properties.<sup>1</sup> However, those who approach the theory of art from a sociological point of view tend to be skeptical about any account of art that appeals to aesthetic properties in a fundamental way. This skepticism takes two overlapping forms, only one of which I will pursue here. The form of skepticism I am interested in is concerned to deny that we need to appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining the production of art. Let us call this *production skepticism*. This form of skepticism does not coincide with skepticism about the appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining our experiences and judgments about art. Let us call that *consumption skepticism*. Examples of consumption skeptics are Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, who think that aesthetic value judgments about art really reflect social status rather than being a response to qualities of the works.<sup>2</sup> In my view, the reasons, such as they are, that Bourdieu and Eagleton put forward in favor of

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consumption skepticism are very weak and based on multiple uncharitable misunderstandings of the category of the aesthetic. Moreover, there are obvious difficulties with the view. I have argued this elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> Consumption skepticism, however, is not the same as production skepticism, which needs to be separately considered. For production skepticism might be true even though consumption skepticism is false. Consumption skepticism does indeed remove one particular remote role for the aesthetic in the story about why works of art are produced. Audiences for works of art do often determine what artists produce, since they tend to demand more of what they like and less of what they do not like. But this role of the aesthetic is less immediately efficacious in art production than the role that the aesthetic plays in art production according to an aesthetic theory of art. An aesthetic theory of art says that to explain art production, we must grant the aesthetic a role in the mind of the artist who produces works of art: minimally, the artist must desire and intend to create something with specific aesthetic qualities. An aesthetic theory of art also grants the aesthetic a role in the mind of the audience who experience works of art and who generate demand for them, but this productive role is less direct than is the role of the aesthetic in the mind of the artist. By contrast, production skepticism denies the aesthetic both of these roles in art production. That is, production skepticism denies both that the aesthetic plays an efficacious role in art production in the mind of the artist and also in the mind of the audience.

To quote one example of production skepticism, Griselda Pollock writes,

I am arguing that feminist art history has to reject all this evaluative criticism and stop merely juggling the aesthetic criteria for appreciating art. Instead it should concentrate on historical forms of explanation of women's art *production*.<sup>4</sup>

Notice the opposition she blithely assumes here between aesthetic criteria of appraisal, on one hand, and art production, on the other. The idea that artists might have aesthetic criteria for production has been silently erased.

Janet Wolff struggles to avoid taking an eliminativist or reductionist position about the aesthetic.<sup>5</sup> She officially affects neutrality about whether the "aesthetic" is a category we should retain or dispense with in talking about art. She feigns to say that she is not saying that the aesthetic is an illusion. (Presumably her commonsense deployment of the notion of aesthetic value in thinking about her own

experience gives her qualms about trashing the notion too thoroughly.) Despite this, it is clear that Wolff will not allow us to appeal to the aesthetic in an explanation of art production. The aesthetic, if it is tolerated, is epiphenomenal in this respect. It does not in any way *drive* the history of art.

Another writer in this vein is Howard Becker. In his book *Art Worlds*, he does not explicitly reject aesthetic explanations of art production and replace them with some other explanation; instead, he is content to describe (in neutral terms) the social structures in which art is produced.<sup>6</sup> But this is to presume the de-aestheticizing strategy without openly saying so. Becker says nothing about why the participants in those social systems bother to engage in those social structures. In a sense, then, he offers no explanation at all of art-making and is content merely to describe at a superficial level how people relate to each other when producing art. The idea that the participants might have a motive for participating has slipped from view. Becker's book is premised on the idea that art production is work like any other form of production,<sup>7</sup> which is fair enough to an extent. But the general principle that all kinds of productive work have the same kind of explanation is dubious. The absence of reference to individual mental content, or any fine-grained details of mental content, inevitably makes such descriptions superficial.

In my view, the central issue in the theory of art is an explanatory one.<sup>8</sup> We need a theory that gives a good explanation of why people create and consume art. On an aesthetic theory of art, the explanation of the fact that people make art and contemplate it is that they want to create things that have aesthetic value and they think they find aesthetic value in things. Crucially, this explanation is not just a *causal* explanation but also a *rational causal* explanation. It reveals to us what people see in making and contemplating art. It makes art-making and art contemplation intelligible. By contrast, according to production and consumption skepticism, the real explanation of the fact that people make art and contemplate it is *not* that they want to create things that have aesthetic value or that they think they find aesthetic value in things, although this is what they think. Instead, art has some other social property that really moves them to make and perceive it. For example, perhaps art reinforces certain social power relations. These sociological explanations thus involve attributing self-deception or false consciousness. They are nonrational explanations. The question we have to consider is whether the aesthetic hypothesis is as good as skeptical hypotheses that ignore the aesthetic.

## SOME/ALL, STRONG/WEAK

In my view, sociologists of art have given us very little to support skepticism about the role of the aesthetic in art production. The normal procedure is to appeal to various nonaesthetic influences on art production. But the step from there to the skeptical conclusion about the role of the aesthetic in art production is problematic. Of course, it is true that there are important nonaesthetic influences on art production. It would be odd if there were not! For example, the prices of different pigments may determine the colors that a patron demands.<sup>9</sup> And the work may reinforce, prescribe, or reflect ideas connected with social power relations. Newly wealthy burghers might want still-life paintings of the produce from which they make their living. But the question is to what extent such factors provide an explanation of the existence and character of works of art. The fundamental problem is that such considerations explain some aspects of works of art but not all of them. The nonaesthetic influences do not tell the whole story. They underdetermine what the work of art is like. The fact that *some* features of a work of art are determined by social factors does not mean that they *all* are. I call this the *some-all fallacy*. Theorists who talk about art from a sociological point of view very often commit this some-all fallacy.

Although the social conditions set certain parameters, within those parameters, the artist exercises free choice about what to create. And some of those choices are made on aesthetic grounds. It is not remotely plausible that every choice the artist makes is extrinsically determined by social conditions. To some degree his choices are autonomous, even if the options among which he chooses are not up to him. Wollflin famously said that not everything is possible at every time, but it is equally true that not everything is *necessary* at every time. For example, perhaps the political conditions surrounding the cold war led to a premium on bold, flat, abstract works in postwar New York, as Serge Guilbaut has argued.<sup>10</sup> But even so, Pollock's drip paintings—celebrated by Clement Greenberg—were underdetermined by those social conditions. Pollock was the source of that aesthetic idea. It was up to him—to drip or not to drip.

That at least is the appearance. But it is not mere appearance. The appearance derives from our commonsense folk wisdom that we bring to bear in explaining art production. Of course, commonsense folk theory of any sort can be wrong, and it can embody misguided ideology. But folk theory can also be a lot better than what is supposed

to supplant it. Some have argued that our folk conception of the mind is misguided. And atheists think that folk theology is false. But where folk theory offers explanations, which seem to be the basis for successful predictions, then there is a burden on the skeptic to show how the phenomenon can better be explained and predicted in other terms and also to show how the folk explanations seem to be successful even though they are not in fact true.

I take it that the burden of proof is against the production skeptic, since aesthetic explanations are part of our commonsense folk theory about our transactions with art, which seems to work well. I concede that a skeptical sociological explanation is sometimes better than the folk aesthetic explanation. For example, people are indeed sometimes moved to make judgements of taste that are "impure," as Kant would say (since their actual determining ground includes the representation of various social circumstances, not just our pleasure or displeasure in our representation of the object).<sup>11</sup> And we are indeed sometimes moved to make works of art for reasons that have nothing to do with aesthetic properties. Such partial truths account for the popularity of sociological theorizing. It is not that such theories have no degree of plausibility. Sometimes they are correct. What I dispute is the idea that *all* folk aesthetic explanation is erroneous. We have not been presented with anything like the evidence to suggest this. Our folk aesthetic explanations work well enough for everyday purposes. And the replacement sociological theory cannot explain all the phenomena that the folk aesthetic explanations explain. So we should retain the folk explanations.<sup>12</sup>

It is a social fact that production skepticism about aesthetic value is something indulged in more by sociologists who consider art than by art historians who consider the social context of art.<sup>13</sup> In fact, there seems to be an inverse correlation: the more empirical evidence is cited, the less the resulting theories exclude reference to the aesthetic as a matter of principle. For example, Richard Peterson's interesting sociological theory (which invokes "gate-keepers" and the like) deploys quite a bit of evidence. But the theory that he builds on that evidence is neutral about the role of aesthetic matters. Moreover, he occasionally mentions aesthetic considerations, not with the sense that he is mentioning something inimical to his theory, but rather as something that has a natural place within it. For example, at one point he writes,

aesthetic innovation was associated with periods of high levels of competition among record companies.<sup>14</sup>

If only more sociologists of art were like Peterson!

We should distinguish strong and weak programs in the sociology of art. The strong program sets out to show how art production is completely determined by the socioeconomic conditions under which it is produced, leaving no role for the ways the artists conceive of their own activity. The weak program, by contrast, allows that both social factors and the artist's self-conception are necessary but not sufficient conditions, which together, and only together, explain the production of art. The weak program is acceptable. But most sociologists of art pursue the strong program.<sup>15</sup>

The general problem with the strong program in the sociology of art is that works themselves drop out of the picture, as it were. But this requires too much false consciousness. Purely sociological analyses can never be a complete explanation of our social transactions with art, although they may be partial explanations. Insofar as the strong program in the sociology of art has such complete explanatory ambitions, it rests on the premise of ignoring the aesthetic. (This was explicit in the quotation from Pollock.) But the appeal to the aesthetic has an explanatory value that purely sociological accounts cannot replace. This is why the strong program in the sociology of art is explanatorily incomplete, in a debilitating way. No serious discussion of the general nature of art, its value and explanation, can take place until we put this anti-aesthetic ideology behind us. Insofar as postmodernist, Marxist, and feminist aesthetics assume the strong sociological program, those programs are defective. Aesthetic explanations are indispensable.<sup>16</sup>

#### PIGGYBACK EXPLANATIONS

Defenders of the aesthetic can go on to make a stronger point—that ideological explanations *depend* on aesthetic explanations. The sociology of art faces the following question: Since one can have ideological expression without art and without any aesthetic aspect, why is it that the ideological and the aesthetic get mixed? The answer, surely, is that propaganda is harnessed to aesthetically excellent products because aesthetic value is independent of propaganda or ideology. The ideological aspect of art rides piggyback on its aesthetic aspect, which the

sociologically minded refuse to recognize. Those anti-aesthetic ideologists who reject the aesthetic as an ideological delusion undermine themselves. They shoot themselves in the foot, since they deprive themselves of plausible ideological explanations.

So it is not merely that works of art have both aesthetic and ideological properties but that the aesthetic properties have explanatory primacy. We need to appeal to an independent aesthetic value to explain why those with an ideology to peddle enlist aesthetic art in their service. For example, much Egyptian art served as propaganda for the Pharaohs. But there is no doubt that it did this effectively partly because of its aesthetic impact.

Or, moving swiftly from ancient Egypt to postwar New York, Clement Greenberg clashed with more sociologically minded theorists over the role of aesthetic explanations in explaining the phenomena of postwar American abstract expressionist art. Contrary to his numerous detractors, I believe that Clement Greenberg's criticism was sometimes (though not always, to be sure) a response to the value in the works he discusses and a subtle articulation of that value.<sup>17</sup> That articulation of value is something Greenberg had a gift for. And Greenberg should be celebrated for his dogged insistence on that value in the face of the consensus that opposed him. There is, of course, more to be said about what drives the history of art. It is true that there are often ideological forces at work. But unless there were what Greenberg notices and elegantly articulates, not only would there be nothing for the history of art to be the history of, but there would be nothing for ideology to latch on to. The aesthetic is an essential part of what drives the evolution of art.

Although Greenberg was in some sense a formalist, interested in what struck the eye, he also had a Hegelian belief in historical trajectory and progress. (In this he was unlike Bell and Fry and more like Gombrich.) And Greenberg tied his formalism and his Hegelianism together in his view of the evolution of twentieth-century art. For Greenberg, American art of the postwar years was where the *Geist* was at, being the culmination of what was happening in Europe in the first half of the century.<sup>18</sup> But we need not swallow this story. We can peel away the Hegel in Greenberg. Moreover, we can admit that Guilbaut was right to argue that there is some truth in the accusation that the ascendancy of postwar American art had a lot to do with its political usefulness to those on the Right who were pursuing the cold war. Nevertheless, Greenberg's analysis of what struck his eye in many cases rings true—true to the works he discusses. And unless

Greenberg were largely right about the aesthetic properties of those works, the ideological phenomena that his detractors highlight would not have been possible.

Now works of art are goods that are made and exchanged in different ways depending on the economic system in which they exist. In the contemporary world, many works of art are, among other things, aesthetic commodities in a capitalist economic system.<sup>19</sup> But they are, at least to an extent, *aesthetic* commodities. People desire works of art partly because of their valuable aesthetic qualities, and that is one reason why they are prepared to pay for them. While the production of art is usually profit driven, that is only because there is a demand for those works, due, in part, to the aesthetic satisfaction they afford. No aesthetic appreciation, no art production. The economic explanation does not supplant the aesthetic explanation—it depends on it! Like ideological explanations, economic explanations sit piggyback on aesthetic explanations.

However, many contemporary works are not capitalist commodities but are funded by the state. This is particularly true of the avant-garde works that particularly interest art theorists. Many avant-garde works are commissioned by, and exhibited in, public museums and galleries or at least publicly subsidized museums or galleries. This form of support has more in common with traditional forms of patronage by the nobility or the church. Few of these works would be produced if they relied entirely on the capitalist art market. Nevertheless, those who control the publicly owned or publicly subsidized art institutions commission and purchase works for reasons. No doubt there are ideological forces at work influencing their decisions. But aesthetic considerations are sometimes among the reasons for commissions and purchases. One can be cynical to an extent, but one must allow at some point that aesthetic considerations play a role in determining choices and hence in determining what gets produced. For example, an arts administrator may decide for ideological reasons that only feminist art will be purchased and exhibited in an exhibition. Nevertheless, unless the supply of such works is very scarce, there will be a latitude of choice, and one range of reasons for choice among competing works or artists who satisfy the ideological criteria will be aesthetic reasons. The case of abstract expressionism is especially interesting in this respect. Guilbaut notes the way that many of those who supported abstract expressionism positively disliked the works. They backed it for political reasons, despite their low aesthetic assessment of it.<sup>20</sup> I think that this degree of cynicism is unusual. Any-



how, someone still had to choose some abstract expressionist works over others. The cynics on the political Right were happy to delegate that task to less cynical arts administrators who were nevertheless in the pay of the cynics. Choice still needed to be exercised between competing works. That was where critics like Greenberg came in. There were many more abstract expressionist artists than could be promoted, so choices had to be made. Abstract expressionism was thought to represent distinctively American political values in a way that might appeal to European intellectuals who were enamored of the Soviet system and ideology in the wake of the Second World War. Jackson Pollock, with his emphasis on individual expression and autonomous action, as opposed to the worthy and dull values that socialist realist "tractor art" embodied, was just what the political Right in America needed. But I would say that Pollock expressed these values better than many of his contemporaries mainly because of the aesthetic virtues of his work. Hence, aesthetic explanations are needed even there.

So not only have we not been presented with remotely compelling sociological reasons to reject the nonskeptical commonsense aesthetic view, any plausible ideological or economic explanation presupposes nonskepticism about the aesthetic. Without a Greenberg to tell us why the works themselves are of value and are thought to be of value, in themselves, no other explanation gets a grip.

If there is to be a sociology of art, what we need is a sociology of the aesthetic, not the sociology of the illusion of the aesthetic.

## BEAUTY AND PLEASURE

There remains a question about exactly how the aesthetic explanation of art production works. We need to say something here if we are to have a viable alternative to production skepticism. I said at the beginning that we can leave open the further analysis of beauty and other aesthetic properties. But whatever analysis we embrace, we need to answer motivational and evaluative questions about why aesthetic properties motivate us and why we value them.

At this point, along with a very long tradition in aesthetics, stretching back at least to the ancient Greeks, we can appeal to pleasure.<sup>21</sup> On a realist account, aesthetic pleasure is our mode of apprehending real aesthetic properties of the world. But on a nonrealist account, aes-

thetic pleasure is a reaction to nonaesthetic perceptions and beliefs, as Hume and Kant thought. On either account, the pleasure must be a very special pleasure. Hume and Kant said many illuminating things about the kind of pleasure it is. For example, I think some of what Kant claimed about the "disinterestedness" of aesthetic pleasure can be defended.<sup>22</sup> There is a lot more to say.<sup>23</sup> But it is clearly intelligible that pleasure motivates us, and it is intelligible that we value it. Hence, it is intelligible that we desire and value the contemplation of things that yield pleasure. Nelson Goodman poked fun at aesthetic theories of art, by contrast with his own high-minded cognitive theory, by the rhetorical device of calling pleasure theories "tingle immersion theories."<sup>24</sup> But I say that there is a lot to be said for a good tingle! Pleasurable tingles motivate most of us, even if they leave Goodman cold. And it could be that certain tingles are of special value in virtue of their distinctive contents, relations, and norms.

However, while the appeal to our pleasure in contemplating beauty is important and part of the story of art production, it is not enough to explain the production of art, because it says nothing about the person or persons who directly produce art. It is not plausible that all art-making is motivated by the desire to produce pleasure, either in others or in oneself. The pleasure we get from art-making is often internal to the process of making. It is not a matter of pleasure in contemplating the work while making it or after having made it, or in the thought that others will take pleasure in it, or even in thinking that one has made something worthwhile.<sup>25</sup> There is an intrinsic pleasure one takes *in* making something. This pleasure in making art is probably not usefully categorized as aesthetic pleasure, which is usually thought of as a *contemplative* pleasure. The pleasure of art-making is pleasure in an *activity*. (I love to *play* my accordion.) The pleasure in making something beautiful is not the same as the pleasure in contemplating something beautiful. Nevertheless, I suspect that the active pleasure of making art stands in some intimate relation to contemplative aesthetic pleasure. It is not likely that we would find making art pleasurable unless we also found contemplating it pleasurable.<sup>26</sup>

A theory of art that appeals to contemplative and active pleasures is surely starting off in a sensible place. For such a theory is in a position to explain why we value art activities without attributing an error. On such a view, the reason we value our activities is transparent to us. That is, it is something we are aware of; it is not something hid-

den from us that is nevertheless a subterranean cause of our activities. A pleasure theory avoids the widespread attribution of false consciousness or some hidden psychological payoff, which only sociological or psychoanalytic analysis can reveal. Rather, we value art activities because we find in them a value that they do indeed possess. By contrast, a theory that purports to explain art in terms of some unknown sociological or psychological factor (art as social control, art as play, etc.) will not be able to provide a plausible explanation of why we value the arts. For our view of why we value art, and the real reason why we value it, will have come apart. On such an account, the explanation of our experiencing and making art would not be transparent to us. The difficulty then is to explain the ubiquitousness and universality of our valuing the arts. How is it that human beings are so widely and deeply deceived in so many different cultures, classes, races, creeds, and eras, although this is never apparent to them? The delusion we would have to believe is just too widespread and too deep-seated in our psychology to be believable. It is far more likely—indeed, overwhelmingly likely—that many of the values we find in contemplating and making art are transparent to us. Preeminent among these values is the pleasure that making and contemplating beauty yields. Maybe the arts involve a specific kind of pleasure that is of particular value, a value greater than that of what Kant calls “pleasure in the agreeable.” But it is pleasure nonetheless.

Let us draw a line here. There is obviously a lot to be said about the nature of aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic judgment, about the nature of beauty and other aesthetic properties, and about the nature of the aesthetic creative imagination. We value and desire making and perceiving beautiful things in virtue of the pleasure we have when we create and appreciate it. Why so is a deep matter. But we undoubtedly do. On that foundation, we can build a theory of art that does justice to its importance to us. Art is, among other things, the art of beauty. Creating and contemplating beauty are sources of pleasures of distinctive sorts. And this is why we value art as highly as we do.

## NOTES

1. If we hold such a view, we can be shy of committing ourselves to a particular theory of aesthetic properties. We can bracket off that issue as a separate topic. The point is to see how far we can get in understanding art by giving an account that draws on aesthetic properties—whatever their nature. Such a theory can be constructed with the

true nature of aesthetic properties as a variable. For one such account, see Monroe Beardsley, "The Aesthetic Definition of Art," in *What Is Art?* edited by Hugh Curtler (New York: Haven, 1983); for another, see Nick Zangwill, "The Creative Theory of Art," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(1995):315-32; and Nick Zangwill, "Aesthetic Functionalism," in *Aesthetic Concepts: Sibley and After*, edited by Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

2. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).

3. See Nick Zangwill, "Against the Sociology of Taste," *Cultural Values Journal* 5(2001), reprinted in Nick Zangwill, *Metaphysics of Beauty* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), chap. 12.

4. Griselda Pollock, *Vision and Difference* (London: Routledge, 1988), 27.

5. Janet Wolff, *The Social Production of Art* (New York: Methuen, 1984), esp. 7, conclusion.

6. Howard Becker, *Art Worlds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

7. *Ibid.*, ix-x.

8. Nick Zangwill, "Groundrules in the Philosophy of Art," *Philosophy* 70(1995):533-544.

9. Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

10. See Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of the Avant Garde* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). See also David Wise, "Spook Art," *ArtNews*, September 2000; and Frances Stonor, *The Cultural Cold War* (New York: New Press, 2000).

11. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, translated by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 65-66.

12. Note that there is absolutely no reason to think that an aesthetic theory of art is committed to some doctrine of the "autonomy" of art. That is setting up a straw man: a work of art can have aesthetic values that depend on the meaning of the work, and aesthetic values need not be the only values of a work. Moreover, an aesthetic theory need not privilege high or fine art forms. Nor need it be committed to extreme formalism about aesthetic properties. Kant, for example, was committed to *none* of this.

13. One very interesting art historian who respects social facts but does not reject aesthetic value is Michael Baxandall. See, for example, his *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) and *Patterns of Intention* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). Contrast Janet Wolff's book, *The Social Production of Art*, which contains little or no empirical evidence. She merely cites the authority of other sociological writers. See also her *Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), for the same flaws.

14. See Richard Peterson, "Cultural Standing through the Production Perspective," in *The Sociology of Culture*, edited by Diana Crane (London: Routledge, 1994), 175.

15. It is an irony that one part of cultural production that might plausibly be submitted for sociological explanation is the twentieth-century theoretical rejection of the aesthetic by sociologists of art. Sociologists are remarkably shy of applying their techniques to their own views!

16. The so-called "new" art history was keen to unearth ideological properties of works of art (and also of writings about them). See *The New Art History*, edited by A. L. Rees and Frances Borzello (London: Camden, 1986). But in fact the "old" art history was

never the naive stereotype that it was made out to be. Earnst Gombrich is as canny as any on this score.

17. See *Clement Greenberg: Collected Essays and Criticism*, 4 vols., edited by John O'Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). See also Clement Greenberg's writings in *Modernism and Modernity*, edited by Benjamin Buchloch, Serge Guilbaut, and David Solkin (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Nova Scotia Press, 1981): "To Cope with Decadence," his contributions to the discussion on T. J. Clark's paper (pp. 188-93), and his contributions to the general panel discussion (pp. 265-77). See also Clement Greenberg, *Homemade Esthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

18. See "Modernist Painting," in *Clement Greenberg: Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 4.

19. See Baxandall's *Painting and Experience*, where he describes an economic system in which works of art were exchanged differently from the way works of art have been bought and sold as commodities for most of the twentieth century.

20. The CIA funded exhibitions in Paris in 1952 and in Vienna in 1959. See Wise, "Spook Art," 163.

21. Plato says that "beauty is what is pleasant through hearing and sight" (*Hippias Major*, 298a.). Aquinas says, "Those things we call beautiful are those that please when they are seen" (*Suma Theologiae*, I.5.4.ad.1). Moreover, the idea that some things "delight the eyes" can be found in *Genesis* (II.9, III.6) and in Homer (*Odyssey*, book IV, line 51).

22. See Nick Zangwill, "UnKantian Notions of Disinterest," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 32 (1992): 149-52; and Nick Zangwill, "Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 53 (1995): 167-76.

23. See Jerry Levinson, "Pleasure and the Value of the Arts," in *Pleasure, Value and the Arts* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

24. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 112.

25. See Nick Zangwill, "Art and Audience," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1999.

26. Kant notes that although art making involves the productive imagination, it also involves taste or judgement. See Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, sec. 50.

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